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Dialogue and Discussion: Reflections on a Socratic Method 
 
Abstract: This article starts from the observation that Socratic dialogues in the Nelson-
Heckmann tradition can create a sense of belonging or community among participants. This 
observation has led me to the current argument that Socratic dialogue offers an alternative to 
more prominent forms of conversation, which I have called ‘discussion’ and ‘discourse of 
uncritical acceptance’. I explain the difference between these forms of conversation by con-
sidering the role of experience in Socratic dialogue and the requirement that participants put 
themselves in each other’s shoes. My argument is structured according to the different phases 
in a Socratic dialogue and placed within the literature on this method, as well as Hannah Ar-
endt’s writing on imagination.  
 




In this article I reflect on my experience as a facilitator and participant in Socratic dialogues 
in the Nelson-Heckmann tradition. I facilitate these dialogues as part of a module for a BA in 
Philosophy, as well as in different community centres. My reflections originate in an observa-
tion made by a student. After the last session of one of the first dialogues I facilitated, the 
student noted how the participants had grown closer together as a group. This comment has 
stayed with me. As a facilitator and participant, I have since observed and experienced what I 
would provisionally describe as a growing sense of belonging among participants in these 
dialogues, even when there is little agreement on the topic of investigation. A community is 
created or strengthened, sometimes only for the duration of the dialogue, while on other oc-
casions it lasts longer. 
 
The observation made me question how this form of Socratic dialogue can be considered dis-
tinctive, and different from other forms of conversation. I shall consider if and how the ob-
served sense of belonging can be described or explained by considering two distinguishing 
characteristics of Nelson-Heckmann dialogues: the emphasis on experience and the require-
ment to put oneself in the position of another. I realise that it is difficult to fully describe the 
observed sense of belonging and even harder to sustain the claim that it is created by Socratic 
dialogue. Do participants indeed experience this sense of community and if so, what is it ex-
actly, and can it be attributed to this particular practice of Socratic dialogue? It is not my in-
tention to provide a definitive answer to these questions in this article. I am not even certain 
that such answers are possible or desirable.
1
 Rather, I intend to explore aspects of the method 
and thus draw attention to an alternative form of conversation. 
 
The argument comes with a difficulty because it is about a method which is not familiar to 
many. The terms ‘Socratic method’ and ‘Socratic dialogue’ describe a wide variety of prac-
tices, ranging from ruthless questioning in Law Schools to critical thinking exercises with 
children. Yet, in this article, they denote a distinctive method, that does not necessarily match 
other understandings of ‘Socratic’.  Moreover, Leonard Nelson claims that his method cannot 
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 Nor do I want to argue that Socratic dialogue should replace all other forms of conversation. Cp. too Helga van 
den Elshout 2003 for a different account of what makes a dialogue Socratic. 
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be explained, but instead should be experienced, and experienced over a period of time. In 
support, he quotes the following famous passage from Plato’s Seventh Letter: 
 
It does not at all admit of verbal expression like other studies, but as a result of 
continued application to the subject itself and communication therewith, it is 
brought to birth in the soul, as suddenly as light that is kindled by a leaping spark, 




Participating once, or reading about Socratic dialogue, cannot replace this ‘continued applica-
tion’. Nelson suggests that therefore it would not even suffice to stop his lecture and engage 
in Socratic dialogue. All he, or for that matter I, can do, is 'to direct your attention to this 
method of teaching and thereby to promote an appreciation of it.' (Nelson 2004, 127)  
 
This article introduces the method of Socratic dialogue by following the structure of a Socrat-
ic dialogue. It is divided into five phases: first one needs to find participants; next a question 
is formed; then experiences are told: one experience is chosen; and a judgment is formed. It 
should be noted that in an actual Socratic dialogue, these five phases cannot always be as 
clearly distinguished as I set them out here, and the judgment is often considered only the 
starting-point for the conversation.
3
 Throughout this article I also present a philosophical un-
derpinning of Socratic dialogue using the work of Hannah Arendt. As I shall argue in the first 
section, there is a need to find a new philosophical underpinning, as practice has moved away 
from its traditional Kantian background. Arendt’s work provides, moreover, a wider context 
for my reflections.   
 
Phase One: Finding Participants 
Socratic dialogues in the Nelson-Heckmann tradition take place in institutes of higher educa-
tion as well as in community centres, businesses, prisons and living rooms. They are usually 
advertised, or they are offered as part of a curriculum, and participants are given a general 
idea of what to expect. In this respect they differ from Socrates’ conversations in Plato’s writ-
ings in which Socrates usually just starts speaking to friends he meets in the street or at a par-
ty.   
 
There is no simple way to invite participants to a dialogue which they will only understand 
once they have experienced it. I normally use two different approaches. The first is to intro-
duce the method by outlining that it allows for a different conversation from those partici-
pants are more likely to be familiar with. I have called these ‘discussion’ and ‘discourse of 
(uncritical) acceptance’. What follows should not be considered a taxonomy of conversation, 
but an indication of the significantly different atmosphere of a Socratic dialogue, which one 
may experience when participating.  
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 Nelson 2004, 126, quoting Plato, The Seventh Letter, 341cd. As Dries Boele argues: ‘Practical philosophy 
must be experienced.’ (Boele 2003, 49) 
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 For a different account of the different phases in a Socratic dialogue, see for instance Bolten 2003, and 
Kopfwerk Berlin 2004. 
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Socratic dialogue is first of all different from ‘discussion’.4 It moves away from an emphasis 
on winning and losing, and from practical concerns to the importance of the conversation it-
self as a shared undertaking. As Kristof van Rossem argues, ‘participants try to understand 
each other and engage in a common enterprise.’ (Van Rossem 2006, 48) In discussion, in 
contrast, two or more positions are thought in conflict with one another and the goal is to 
convince the other and win the argument. Extreme examples of this kind of conversation I 
consider Prime Minister’s Question Time, or discussions on Fox News. Such conversations 
are characterised by their adversarial nature of challenges and refutations. At its best, this 
kind of refutation helps sharpen arguments, at its worst, it turns into a shouting match.  
 
The second form of conversation is one where a difference of opinion is not pursued at all. Its 
proponents use commonplaces like ‘Everyone is entitled to their own opinion’. Examples of 
this kind of conversation come from awkward seminars, where students will not explore or 
challenge each other’s positions and arguments, as well as from conversations where, for of-
ten good reasons, people are determined not to offend. At its best this kind of conversation 
allows for differences to exist, at its worst it suggests a lack of intellectual curiosity. It can 
also silence much needed criticism. I shall call this kind of conversation ‘discourse of (uncrit-
ical) acceptance’. 
 
These broad outlines suggest that Socratic dialogue differs from each of the two kinds of 
conversations above, in that it does not accept two assumptions that discussion and discourse 
of (uncritical) acceptance share. First, they both assume that reconciliation or rapprochement 
is not desirable or even possible. The more adversarial form of discussion looks for weak-
nesses in the opponent’s position. This position is proven inconsistent, or even unsound and 
its presenter may be ridiculed. The ‘discourse of (uncritical) acceptance’, on the other hand, 
does not try to reconcile difference, but allows these to persist. Second, underlying both are 
practical outcomes: debating politicians need to make decisions for the country or their com-
munity. In the case of the discourse of (uncritical) acceptance the lack of inquiry can be 
prompted by a desire to live peacefully together, or the concern for one’s position in relation 
to others or to authority. Socratic dialogue, in contrast, aims for mutual understanding and 
agreement, and does not concern itself immediately with practical outcomes.  
 
The method can also be introduced by relating its extraordinary history. The method of So-
cratic dialogue central to this paper was first developed by the philosopher and mathemati-
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 Here I am using a distinction by Van Rossem, who provides an insightful table of characteristics for discussion 
and dialogue each (2006, 49). Of course, as he adds, 'any conversation has a bit of both'. I shall not reproduce 
the full table here, but limit myself to a few distinctions:  
‘Discussion (means ‘shaking out’)  Dialogue (means ‘knowing through’)  
... 
Aimed at decisions and actions  Aimed at insight in the value of judgments  
... 
Attacking and defending   Investigating and checking  
... 
Convincing    Investigation  
... 
Defensive or offensive attitude  Attitude of taking the others’ point of view 
Answering    Questioning   
Speed     Slowness 
Individually orientated   Community orientated’ 
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cian Nelson. Nelson’s Socratic method is inspired by Immanuel Kant, Jacob Fries, and by 
Plato’s dialogues, as well as by Nelson’s desire to train political activists. (Birnbacher & 
Krohn 2004, 10) The method is, as Nelson explains in his 1922-lecture, ‘the art of teaching 
not philosophy but philosophizing, the art not of teaching about philosophers but of making 
philosophers of the students.’ (Nelson 2004, 126)  
 
After Nelson’s early death at the age of 45, his students continued his work, and even facili-
tated and participated in dialogues as part of their resistance in the first years of the National 
Socialist regime (Miller 2000). After the war Gustav Heckmann especially developed the 
method of Socratic dialogue further. His contribution can be summarised as follows:  
 
Heckmann’s contribution to the development of the method of Socratic Dialogue 
consists, among other things, of his detaching the method from the specific neo-
Kantian background assumptions with which Nelson linked it, and providing So-
cratic Dialogue with a broader basis. … With Heckmann, the method of Socratic 
Dialogue acquires a more independent role. Nelson’s idea that the consensus 
reached in a group dialogue can be identified with ‘the truth’ is weakened. (Birn-
bacher & Krohn 2004, 11) 
 
With Heckmann the neo-Kantian background of the Socratic method becomes less promi-
nent. This becomes clear when, for instance, considering the possible outcome of a Socratic 
dialogue. Few people nowadays assume, as Nelson did, that participants can find ‘universal 
truths’. (Nelson 2004, 135) Instead, it has been argued that the truth is provisional and true 
only for this particular group at this particular time. Thus, Heckmann talks of ‘proven for the 
time being’.5 Others argue that participants may receive a glimpse of the truth in the dialogue. 
(Kessels 2005) The lessened significance of the neo-Kantian background is also evident from 
the fact that when explaining method and rules, facilitators usually consider pedagogy rather 
than philosophy. Relating the Socratic method to Arendt’s work, as I aim to do in this article, 
can thus provide an alternative philosophical foundation and explanation of the method. 
 
Phase Two: The Question  
Participants typically number between six and twelve. When they have gathered in some-
one’s living room, in a community centre, or a classroom, the facilitator may want to verify 
that they are there of their own volition. Their willingness is important, for even though So-
cratic dialogues can be very enjoyable, they are rarely easy. For this article, I will need to as-





The philosophical question that is central to the dialogue has often been decided in advance, 
in order to save time. The question should be answerable by experience and reason alone. 
Examples of such questions are: what is friendship? What does it mean to be a member of a 
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 Heckmann 2004, 112. The translator has even added quotation to this phrase. 
6
 This assumption is certainly not without its difficulties, but these are complex and need treatment in a separate 
article. The assumption underlines governmental policy papers such as the Browne report. (Browne 2010; cp. 
Collini 2010) Its opposite, the assumptions that students do not attend a course freely, I consider even more 
problematic.  
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community? When is one allowed to lie? etcetera. (Cp. Kopfwerk Berlin 2004, 149-155) The 
participants act as each other’s midwives, questioning and probing positions. The facilitator 
does not contribute to the content of the dialogue, and in this respect differs from Socrates in 





Phase Three: the Experience 
At the beginning of the dialogue participants are asked to relate an experience which they 
consider relevant for the question. Thus, in reply to the question ‘What is friendship?’ they 
can offer an incident or event, where they experienced or witnessed friendship - or the lack 
thereof. In answer to the question, ‘When is one allowed to lie?’ they can think of instances 
when someone lied to them, or they lied themselves, and would judge this acceptable - or not.  
 
The centrality of experience is based on Socrates’ practice and his famous dictum ‘The unex-
amined life is not worth living’ (Apology 38a). Nelson brings in an additional reason:  
 
If we were here to discuss the meaning of the philosophical concept of substance, 
we should most probably become involved in a hopeless dispute, in which the 
sceptics would very likely soon get the best of it. But if, on the conclusion of our 
debate, one of the sceptics failed to find his overcoat beside the door where he 
had hung it, he would hardly reconcile himself to the unfortunate loss of his coat 
on the ground that it simply confirmed to his philosophical doubt of the perma-
nence of substance. (Nelson 2004, 134) 
 
Nelson makes experience central to philosophical dialogue, not just because experience is 
important to investigate, as Socrates would have it, but also because it directs the conversa-
tion away from hypotheticals. The emphasis on experience allows for different argumenta-
tion. The experience offered in response to the question ‘what is the meaning of substance?’ 
would be the sceptic relating the occasion where his overcoat went missing. The experience 
thus does not need to be anything sensational. Indeed, I find that simple examples often work 
best. Yet however simple, the example comes from personal experience and thus Chatham 
House Rule applies. (I.e. outside the room one can discuss what was said, but not who said 
it.) 
 
The central role of experience is not always appreciated by participants. (This is, incidentally, 
especially true of trained philosophers.
8
) Some participants will express reluctance to explore 
their experience, as they consider it too limited a starting-point. They prefer to start from a 
standard definition instead and argue that a singular experience will not provide an overview 
or all-encompassing insight into the topic of conversation.  
 
These are important objections. Depending on the situation a facilitator will decide on the 
best way to explain that while other methods have their value, it is also worth investigating 
experience, and that such an investigation can lead to more general insights. Arendt’s work 
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 It is now generally acknowledged that such interventions are not strictly neutral or objective. (Cp. Van Rossem 
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 Cp. Nelson (2004, 149-150) who is quite severe on the philosophy student; cp. too Altorf 2013) 
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provides an additional argument. Experience is central to Arendt’s phenomenological herme-
neutical approach. Phenomenology is, as the name suggests, concerned with phenomena, or 
appearances, i.e. not with ‘things as they are, but with how they appear to us, or our experi-
ence of them’. (Smith 2013) Different people will experience things differently and for Ar-
endt this is crucial for our sense of reality. We may agree that there is an elephant in the 
room, but not what it looks like, or why it is there. In our disagreement, we affirm its exist-
ence as something more than an individual’s fantasy. In contrast, when no one acknowledges 
the elephant in the room, I may start doubting my assessment of a situation and thus of reali-




For Arendt, Marieke Borren explains, lived experience differs from the notion of experience 
in the tradition of (strong) empiricism:  
 
Arendt holds that incidents, facts, and events are not immediately clear to us. Ex-
periences require interpretation in order to convince or disclose their explicit 
meaning. For (strong) empiricists, experience points to a collection of mere sense 
data that refer to entities existing independently from the perceiver or observer. 
(Borren 2013, 233)  
 
Borren argues that for Arendt ‘[e]xperiences require interpretation’. Nelson’s example of the 
sceptic can illustrate this. The absence of the coat indicates that the sceptic lives in a world 
where coats do not always stay where we leave them. When recognising the experience, it 
will be interpreted. For instance, the focus will be on the absence of the overcoat rather than 
background noise, or the weather outside, unless of course the sceptic links the absence of the 
coat to the weather. All the same, the experience is also open for further or diverging inter-
pretations: is this the work of a prankster, or a sign of a cruel universe where it does not rain 
unless one is without coat or umbrella? 
 
Arendt thus shows both the importance of, and the need for investigating experience. It is im-
portant to share individual experience and take it serious as material for investigation, be-
cause it contributes to our sense of reality. There is also a need to investigate experience, be-
cause its meaning is not always immediately clear to us. Others can help us understand it, or 
challenge our initial understanding.  
 
Phase Four: Choosing one Experience 
Once a number of experiences have been told, the participants in a Socratic dialogue will 
choose one of these for their dialogue. The limitation to one example is introduced for practi-
cal reasons. It focuses the conversation by providing a factual event that grounds the conver-
sation. The other experiences remain in the background, and can become part of the dialogue 
at a later stage.  
  
The example is selected using a number of criteria: it needs to be concrete (i.e. it needs to be 
clear where and when it happened and the example-giver needs to play a part in it), it needs 
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to be limited (otherwise it will take too long to tell), and it needs to be emotionally closed (it 
should not concern a situation in which the example-giver is still emotionally involved. A 
Socratic dialogue is a philosophical investigation and has no immediate therapeutic goal
10
). 
The example also needs to be relevant, i.e. it needs to be in some way related to the question. 
Sometimes this criterion creates fierce discussion, in which participants disagree what the 
example is about. Significantly, disagreement can be confirmation that the example is rele-
vant, when it leads to further investigation of the question.  
 
The one remaining criterion is the most difficult: the example needs to be of interest to eve-
ryone. This does not mean that it needs to be very complicated or sensational, though less 
experienced groups do sometimes choose those examples. Rather, the example needs to be 
philosophically interesting, i.e. it needs to allow for philosophical investigation.   
 
A second and even more important aspect of the criterion that the example needs to be of in-
terest to everyone is that participants need to be able to recognise the experience, to put them-
selves in the shoes of the example-giver. This is important because once the example has 
been chosen, retold and written down on a flip-chart, participants are expected to do exactly 
that, to put themselves in the shoes of the example-giver, so that not just one person’s, but 
everyone’s experience is under investigation.  
 
This requirement is often questioned by participants. They argue that they cannot put them-
selves in someone else’s position, because they were not there, or they would respond very 
differently to the issue at hand. Some even hold that it is impossible in principle to put one-
self in someone else’s position. Others question what it means: do they have to imagine 
themselves as the other (as a woman, as a man, as someone with perfect eyesight, or 6 feet 
tall)? 
 
In an actual dialogue the facilitator will need to decide how to address these important objec-
tions in a way that both encourages philosophical investigation and does not divert the inves-
tigation into a discussion on method. That is, the facilitator cannot disregard these concerns 
and also expect and embody an investigative attitude. (Van Rossem 2006, 49) At the same 
time, he or she should keep in mind that most - if not all - participants are there to investigate 
the question, not the method.  
 
Experience in facilitation can again help here, as well as further understanding of the underly-
ing assumptions in these objections. Let me starts with the objection that it is not possible to 
know what someone else experiences. This objection is usually based on the assumption that 
only the experiencer has access to his or her experience. In dialogues I have facilitated philo-
sophically schooled participants have occasionally mentioned Thomas Nagel’s ‘What Is It 
Like to Be a Bat?’ (1974), and argued that we cannot know what another experiences, just as 
we cannot know what it is like to be a bat.   
 
Yet, on closer look, Nagel’s article seems to confirm rather than deny the possibility of put-
ting oneself in the position of someone else. Nagel may doubt our ability to know what it is 
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like to be a bat for a bat, as we can only know the human version of what it is like to be a bat. 
Yet, the same does not apply to humans. Humans can recognise the experience of someone 
else, if they have had a similar experience: ‘It is often possible to take up a point of view oth-
er than one’s own ... one person can know or say of another what the quality of the other’s 
experience is.’ Nagel also adds:  ‘The more different from oneself the other experiencer is, 
the less success one can expect with this enterprise.’ (Nagel 1974, 325, 326). In a similar 
way, a facilitator may suggest to participants that in daily life we constantly assume that we 
can recognise each other’s experience. If participants are unable to work with one example, 
they should be encouraged to look for another.   
 
If it is indeed possible to put oneself in the position of another, what is required of the partic-
ipants? I find it helpful to think of the following distinctions. Putting oneself in the position 
of another is an imaginative change in space and/or time, which takes one of two forms. We 
can imagine ourselves in the other person’s situation, or imagine that what is happening to 
that person is happening to us in our situation. The distinction between these two can be a 
matter of emphasis or personal preference. For instance, it may be easier to imagine oneself 
being bound in Plato’s cave, than to imagine the shackles coming to your chair. Or, a glance 
at one’s coat on its hanger near the door can make the experience of the sceptic all the more 
vivid.  
 
Especially at the start of a dialogue, some participants imagine themselves as bystanders, ra-
ther than in the position of the example-giver. This perspective often reveals itself when par-
ticipants start offering advice. (Bolten 2003, 35-36) It can come from unfamiliarity with the 
method or an understandable reluctance to investigate one’s own experience. It is indeed dif-
ficult to do so and one makes oneself vulnerable. (Bolten 2003, 39). For a facilitator it is then 
important to encourage a more investigative approach, in which the experience of all partici-
pants is under discussion.  
 
The Dutch facilitator Dries Boele further investigates this requirement with a very perceptive 
distinction between zich verplaatsen and zich inleven. (Boele 2003, 161-169) The distinction 
is probably best translated as the distinction between putting oneself in the other’s position 
and imagining oneself in the other’s position11: participants are asked either for their response 
given to the situation, or the experience of the situation. The former is described above, 
where for instance we put ourselves in the situation of the sceptic, who did not find his or her 
coat, or that we will not find ours now.  
 
For the latter, imagining oneself in the position of someone else (zich inleven), Boele ex-
plains, participants are asked to look at their own experience and see if they have an experi-
ence that is similar.
12
 Boele points out that when people are in the same situation, they do not 
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 The term zich inleven is difficult to translate. ‘To empathise’ creates difficulties because this term has a par-
ticular meaning in the work of Arendt, as will become clear in the next section. ‘To immerse’ moves away too 
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 Boele adds sound methodological reasons for preferring the second option. Putting oneself in another’s posi-
tion asks for hypothesis and is in that sense antithetical to Socratic dialogue and its emphasis on experience. 
Moreover, it can lead to giving each other advice rather than investigating the issue at hand.  
 9 
necessarily experience it in the same way. For instance, the unexpected halt of a lift may 
frighten one passenger and not affect the passenger standing next to him or her. Similarly, the 
sceptic and I may not care about our coat in the same way. I find the experience of losing my 
coat unsettling, for I am always cold, whereas the sceptic could be oblivious to weather con-
ditions and will consider losing a coat merely a nuisance. If I am then asked to imagine (zich 
inleven) myself in the position of the sceptic, I should for instance look for an experience 




The above suggests that this act of imagination (zich inleven) is complicated to describe. At 
the same time, it is quite close to something we do regularly. This exercise of the imagina-
tion, I would argue, allows one to say something like: ‘I know what that is like. I had that 
when …’ It creates thus a complicated combination of sameness and difference: a similar ex-
perience can be experienced in different situations and it can be interpreted differently.  
 
In the practice of dialogue it may not be always possible or even desirable to distinguish ex-
actly between the different forms of imagination outlined above (zich verplaatsen en zich 
inleven). Yet, it is important (especially for the facilitator) to keep these distinctions in mind. 
They make clear how everyone’s experience is under investigation, and not just that of the 
example-giver. They also suggest which differences in opinion are in particular fruitful for 
further investigation. For what will spur on the investigation is not so much, or not only, the 
different ways in which we experience a situation, but the different ways in which we inter-
pret the same experience. It is important to recognise differences in experience, but these are 
up to an extent non-negotiable. The sceptic and I will not experience losing our coats in the 
same way (and why should we?). Difference in interpretation, on the other hand, we often 
welcome. For instance, when we are overcome by sadness, we can find our experience ex-
pressed differently or even better in a poem or a story, than in our own words.  
 
Arendt provides a helpful philosophical framework for this exercise of the imagination. She 
mentions imagination in a number of articles and books.
14
 Her Lectures on Kant’s Political 
Philosophy provide both a description of imagination and argue for its ubiquity. I provide on-
ly an outline of her argument here, before I move to an understanding of imagination that is 
closer to Socratic dialogue. For Kant, Arendt argues, imagination is a faculty that makes pre-
sent what is absent. This definition of imagination is in itself not surprising or controversial, 
as Arendt makes clear. (Arendt 1992, 79) Arendt also shows how for Kant imagination is 
present in all cognition, as it is an essential ingredient of perception. (Arendt 1992, 81) 
 
A different aspect of imagination appears in Arendt’s 1954 essay ‘Understanding and Poli-
tics’. In this essay, Arendt is concerned with understanding. She is looking for understanding, 
in particular understanding of totalitarianism, and yet she finds that the tools for understand-
ing were lost in totalitarianism: ‘… the very event, the phenomenon, which we try - and must 
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try - to understand has deprived us of our traditional tools of understanding.’ (Arendt 2005, 
310) 
 
Arendt describes understanding as ‘an unending activity by which, in constant change and 
variation, we come to terms with and reconcile ourselves to reality, that is, try to be at home 
in the world.’ (Arendt 2005, 307-8) She links this activity to imagination, which is under-
standing or from which understanding springs. Her wording is poetical, when she writes at 
the end of the essay that imagination  
 
enables us to see things in their proper perspective, to be strong enough to put 
that which is close at a certain distance so that we can see and understand it with-
out bias and prejudice, to be generous enough to bridge abysses of remoteness 
until we can see everything that is too far from us as though it were our own af-
fair. This distancing of some things and bridging the abysses to others is part of 
the dialogue of understanding, for whose purposes direct experience establishes 
too close a contact and mere knowledge erects artificial barriers. (Arendt 2005, 
323) 
 
Imagination is both a bridging exercise for what is too distant, and an exercise in distancing 
ourselves from bias and prejudice. The outcome is to ‘see everything that is too far from us as 
though it were our own affair’. 
 
This quotation provides a good description of the use of imagination in Socratic dialogue. 
The first part describes the imagination of the example-giver. He or she should be ‘strong 
enough’ - this adjective is very appropriate, for it is not always easy to be the example-giver - 
to no longer lay superior claims to an example. The example-giver should not change the fac-
tual nature of the experience (and this includes feelings etc.), but neither feel sovereign in in-
terpreting it. The second part applies to the other participants, who need to be ‘generous 
enough’ and ‘see everything that is too far from us as though it were our own affair’. Partici-
pants should try and make the example their own. If they cannot do so, a different example 
should be chosen.   
 
Phase 5: The Judgment 
The next phase in the Socratic dialogue is judgment, which some facilitators consider to be 
only the start of the actual dialogue. The example-giver and sometimes every participant are 
asked to provide a judgment that relates the question to the example. In this phase it is im-
portant to stay as close to the example as possible. As Hans Bolten argues, it is usually not 
difficult for participants to express an opinion or to provide a general judgment. The difficul-
ty lies in forming a judgment that is closely related to and comes out of the experience under 
discussion. (Bolten 2003, 41)   
 
The judgment made may not be – as Bolten observes – anything special. The sceptic could 
for instance say, ‘I was surprised, because I expected my coat to be near the door, where I left 
it.’ That is not an earth shattering insight, but it is very different from the position taken in the 
original, purely speculative debate (‘his philosophical doubt of the permanence of substance’ 
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(Nelson 2004, 134; cp. above)). An important aspect of the dialogue is to establish what opin-
ions we actually hold (quid facti). Other participants may provide yet other judgments. 
 
Forming the initial judgment introduces the important aspect of determining the reasons for 
holding this opinion (quid juris). Establishing those reasons will introduce philosophical po-
sitions. The sceptic may argue that he or she has never observed any coat disappearing spon-
taneously (a form of empiricism), or that without the assumption that a coat does not move 
spontaneously the world does not make much sense (a form of transcendental philosophy). 
Socratic dialogue thus provides an entrance into philosophical debate, through an investiga-
tion of our own experiences.  
 
A detailed comparison between this phase and Arendt's writing on judgment will have to wait 
for another paper, not in the least because Arendt's writing on this topic is notoriously diffi-
cult.
15
 In lieu of a full paper, I note a few things. The judgment phase can be related to a third 
occurrence of imagination in Arendt’s work. In Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy Ar-
endt describes imagination as ‘enlarged mentality’:  
 
 [The “enlargement of the mind”] is accomplished by “comparing our judgment 
with the possible rather than the actual judgments of others, and by putting our-
selves in the place of another man”.  The faculty that makes this possible is called 
imagination. … To think with an enlarged mentality means that one trains one’s 
imagination to go visiting. (Arendt 1992, 42-43) 
 
With Socratic dialogue in mind, one may note the importance Arendt attaches to imagination, 
here as preparation for judgment. It is also helpful to recall the distinction between putting or 
imagining (zich inleven) oneself in the position of someone else, especially in the context of 
Arendt’s emphatic argument that imagination is not empathy.  
   
In the Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy Arendt emphasises that this enlarged mentali-
ty should not be confused with empathy, which she understands as a passive acceptance of 
what others think: 
 
To accept what goes on in the minds of those whose “standpoint” (actually, the 
place where they stand, the conditions they are subject to, which always differ 
from one individual to the next, from one class or group compared to another) is 
not my own would mean no more than passively to accept their thought, that is, to 
exchange their prejudices for the prejudices proper to my own station. (Arendt 
1992, 43) 
 
It is debatable whether empathy is indeed this passive (cp. Baron-Cohen 2011). More im-
portant for the present discussion is Arendt’s underlying concern, which is the ‘exchange’ of 
one set of prejudices for another. Arendt’s objection to what she calls empathy is the threat of 
                                               
15
 For instance, commentators disagree to what extent the Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy present her 
own thoughts or should be read as an explanation of Kant (Borren 2013), or to what extent the notion of judg-
ment changes in her work (Hermsen & Villa 1999). For these textual and other difficulties with Arendt's writing 
on judgment, see the works quoted as well as Beiner's interpretative essay (esp. 89-94).  
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sameness. It seems to me that this threat is more palpable in relation to putting oneself in an-
other’s position, than in relation to imagining (zich inleven) oneself in that position. If I put 
myself in another's position there is the risk of accepting all the aspects of their position. If I 
imagine myself in someone else's position, I am engaging in an exercise of sameness and dif-
ference described above. I am thinking of a similar experience though not necessarily in a 
similar situation. Both Arendt and any Socratic dialogue facilitator would welcome such di-
versity. It is through this plurality that we learn to be critical of not just the ‘prejudices and 
traditions one inherits’, but also our own16, and that we come close to an understanding of a 
world that we share.  
 
Coda 
At this point, the dialogue has only started, and depending on the agreed time the participants 
will continue to investigate their positions and arguments, and the underlying suppositions for 
hours, the rest of the day, or even for a week. I argued at the start that this overview cannot 
replace the experience of doing a Socratic dialogue. What it intends to do is draw attention to 
the method and show the distinctive atmosphere of Socratic dialogue, which I relate to the 
emphasis on experience and the importance of imagination.  
 
The reflections in this article began with my initial observation that participants in a Socratic 
dialogue often share a sense of belonging. This sense is and remains difficult to describe, yet 
further insight can be had by connecting it to Arendt’s ‘to be at home in the world’17, and to 
the emphasis on experience and imagination in a Socratic dialogue. Participants in a Socratic 
dialogue share experiences. The emphasis on experience comes from Socrates’ practice as 
well as Nelson’s desire to avoid hypothetical turns. Its significance comes to the fore in a 
very different way in Arendt’s work. Shared experience strengthens our sense of reality and 
thus our resistance to totalitarianism. 
 
Participants are also asked to use their imagination and put themselves in someone else’s po-
sition. This does not imply that all think alike. On the contrary, disagreement is to be ex-
pected and welcomed, despite the difficulties it can bring. Disagreement allows for deeper 
understanding and a sense of reality. It is this insight that distinguishes Socratic dialogue 
from ‘discussion’ and ‘discourse of (uncritical) acceptance’. Whereas the other forms of con-
versation tend to assume irreconcilable difference and are orientated towards conversation as 
a means to an end, participants in a Socratic dialogue try to explore experience together for 
the sake of the exploration.  A Socratic dialogue rarely ends in full consensus, though partici-
pants might find some minor points of consensus along the way. For the time of the dialogue 
and often continuing afterwards, a community can come into existence. A community, more-
over, which shares experiences from diverse situations and judges those in a variety of ways.  
                                               
16
 Arendt 1992, 42: ‘To think critically applies not only to doctrines and concepts one receives from others, to 
the prejudices and traditions one inherits; it is precisely by applying critical standards to one's own thought that 
one learns the art of critical thought. And this application one cannot learn without publicity, without the testing 
that arises from contact with other people's thinking.’ 
17
 Arendt 2005, 308; cp. 'phase four'. For an excellent analysis of Arendt’s notion of world, see Borren 2009. If 
this connection can be made, it underlines the importance of any sense of community experienced in a Socratic 
dialogue in a different way, as it may even help understand the use of Socratic dialogue as a form of resistance 
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